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3.1  Introduction 
In  this  paper  we analyze the relationship  between  the magnitude  of  re- 
sources that a firm invests in trade protection and the changes in a firm’s mar- 
ket value that result from the imposition of trade restraints. The study focuses 
specifically  on trade protection  in the U.S.  steel industry between  1977 and 
1984. The analysis is grounded in collective action theory, which assumes that 
firms will only invest in the political process if the expected benefits of their 
influence over the public policy process are greater than the costs of political 
activity (Olson  1971). Firms in an industry seek trade protection because the 
higher domestic prices resulting from the restriction of imports bring income 
gains in the short run when capital  is relatively immobile among industries 
(Baldwin 1985, 11). Our concern is with the relationship between firm politi- 
cal activity and the change in market value of the firm within a single industry, 
not with the ability of the steel industry to overcome the free-rider problem. 
Several previous studies of the steel industry have estimated the impact of 
trade restraints on the industry as a whole. Crandall (1981, 46)  develops an 
econometric model of  the impact of  the trigger price mechanism  (TPM) on 
U.S. import prices, U.S. domestic prices, and the import share of steel in the 
U.S.  market. In this analysis he is specifically concerned with the responsive- 
ness of  U.S. steel prices to world market conditions  and to pressures  from 
imports. He found that the TPM raised imported steel prices by about 5 per- 
cent a year or 10 percent  by  1979 and that  aggregate domestic  steel prices 
averaged 2.7 percent more than they would have without the TPM. Assuming 
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that imports constitute 15 percent of the U.S. market, he found that the price 
increase of U.S.-produced steel that could be attributed to the TPM was about 
1.1 percent (p.  11 1). He further found that the decline in the value of  the 
dollar and inflation did more to explain the reduction in the market share of 
imports than  the TPM.  Crandall concludes that  the TPM  affected  import 
prices much more than domestic prices. 
Hufbauer,  Berliner,  and Elliott (1986) also estimate the effect of  import 
restraint programs on the domestic price of  steel. For the period  1979-81, 
they estimate that the TPM resulted in a 6.4 percent increase in  the cost of 
domestic steel and about a 15.9 percent increase in foreign steel prices. They 
further estimate that by  1981, the gains from the restraints to US producers 
amounted to $2.77 billion. 
Tarr and Morkre (1984) and Hickock (1985), using Crandall’s (1981) esti- 
mates of price elasticities, have estimated the cost of an 18.5 percent import 
quota on total U.S. steel imports. Tarr and Morkre calculated the discounted 
present value of the losses to the U.S. economy over a four-year period to be 
$2.83 billion. The discounted present value of  the gains to U.S.  producers 
were estimated to be  $1.52 billion while the quota rents to foreigners dis- 
counted over the four-year period  were about $2.02 billion. Hickock con- 
cludes that the cost to consumers of reducing imports to 18.5 percent of  the 
U.S. market would be about $2 billion annually. This is based on her findings 
that the restrictions will result in a 5 percent price increase on imported steel 
and a 4 percent price increase on domestically produced steel. 
Tarr (1989) states that the proliferation of  voluntary restraint agreements 
(VRAs) on steel imports costs the U.S. $600 million a year in 1984 dollars. 
This analysis does attempt to estimate the amount that goes to U.S. steel pro- 
ducers. Instead he argues that the U.S. could achieve the same level of import 
protection at 15 percent of the cost if exporters were not allowed to keep the 
quota rents. 
A  1984 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzes the po- 
tential economic effects of a 15 percent quota on steel imports, predicting that 
from 1985 to 1989, $12.5 billion (1982 dollars) would be transferred to do- 
mestic producers. This amount reflects the increase in revenues to firms able 
to sell their pre-quota amounts of  steel at the higher post-quota prices. By 
1989, according to the study, domestic producers would be able to charge $51 
a ton above the no-quota price (1984,43). 
All the above studies suggest that the potential financial gains to the steel 
industry as a whole are great enough to motivate individual firms to persuade 
the government to restrict imports. In contrast, we  measure the benefits of 
trade protection to individual firms, using event study methodology from fi- 
nance and accounting. The central question we address is whether firms that 
invest the most resources in attempting to influence trade policy are the big- 
gest beneficiaries from the imposition of  trade restraints. More specifically, 
the objective of  the empirical analysis is to determine whether firms that de- 77  Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection 
vote the most resources to the political pursuit of trade protection receive the 
greatest returns, as evaluated by their shareholders, from the reduction of  im- 
ports. 
To  provide some context for the empirical analysis, we  briefly review the 
restrictive trade programs for steel put in place between 1977 and 1984. We 
next discuss the theory of  collective action that is used to structure our empir- 
ical analysis. This is followed by a description of  (1) the empirical model we 
test; (2) the specific measures used in the analysis; and (3) the regression re- 
sults. We  conclude by discussing the implication of  our results for collective 
action theory and more generally for trade policy. 
3.2  The Political Activity of Steel Firms 
3.2.1  1977: Trigger Price Mechanism 
A sharp downturn in world steel demand in 1975 seriously affected the steel 
industry worldwide.  The  ensuing  scramble for  market  shares  sent  prices 
downward and eroded profit margins, which especially hurt the relatively in- 
efficient producers in the United States and the European Community. The 
November 1975 voluntary export restraint (VER) between the EC and Japan 
provided incentives to both Japanese and European steelmakers to seek ex- 
panded export markets, predominantly the U.S.  (Jones 1986, 113). Import 
share of the U.S.  market rose from 13.4 percent in 1974 to 17.8 percent by 
the beginning of 1977 (Hufbauer et al. 1986, 156, 165). (Table 3.1 documents 
the increase in foreign import penetration in the U.S.  steel market.) 
U. S. steel producers responded defensively to increased import penetra- 
tion.  Gilmore Steel petitioned against Japanese producers  for selling steel 
plate in West Coast markets below the cost of  production. Steel industry lob- 
byists also descended on Washington, prompting their allies in Capitol Hill’s 
Steel Caucus to propose several pieces of protectionist legislation. Congres- 
Table 3.1  Imported Steel Shares in the US.  Market 
Share of U.S.  Market Held by 
Period  EC  Japan  Canada  Others  Total 
_____________  _____ 
1969-73  6.5  5.9  1  .o  1.4  14.8 
197478  5.2  6.5  1.4  2.4  15.5 
1980  4.1  6.3  2.5  3.4  16.3 
1982  7.3  6.8  2.4  5.3  21.8 
1984  6.3  6.6  3.2  10.1  26.2 
Source: U.S.  International Trade Commission, “Carbon and Certain Alloy Products,” U.S.  Inter- 
national Trade Commission Publication  1553, vol.  I  (Washington, D.C.: GPO,  July  1984), a- 
139; Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys, “Steel and Heavy Machinery,” Basic Analysis, 7 July 
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sional steel sympathizer Rep. Charles Vanik  (D.-Ohio),  criticized  the slow 
administrative process  of  antidumping  investigations:  “By  the time you do 
something  with  this  (dumping)  process,”  he  lamented,  “industry  won’t  be 
around in  your community  anymore”  (Purchasing 1977b, 9). The industry 
used the media to tell the American public that imported steel was the cause 
of massive layoffs and the domestic industry’s competitive demise. 
Japanese and European steel-producing interests, sensing the protectionist 
sentiment in the United States, offered to continue voluntary restraint  agree- 
ments, which were originally implemented in 1969. To avoid violating GATT 
rules, the Carter administration adopted the trigger price mechanism (TPM), 
a solution based  on referent prices,  in December  1977 (effective  1 January 
1978). The TPM established a floor price of steel based on Japanese produc- 
tion costs (deemed to be the lowest in the world) plus a margin for transport 
and profit markups.  Any sales of imports below the this price would trigger 
an immediate antidumping investigation by the U. S. Treasury Department. In 
exchange for this program aimed at reducing imports from 20 percent to 12- 
14 percent of the U.S. market (Purchasing 1978, 21), U.S. steel firms agreed 
to abandon their unfair trading petitions against foreign producers. 
3.2.2 
In  1979 steel producers  were optimistic  about the  strength  of  U.S. steel 
sales. On 1 January  1979 the trigger price was raised 7 percent,  which was 
expected to cut imports by 20 percent to sixteen million tons annually (Busi- 
ness Week 1979a, 64).  Steel producers argued that import restrictions contrib- 
uted to the government’s anti-inflation efforts because their costs per ton were 
lowest when they ran at 90 percent capacity. 
Although the implementation of the TPM in January 1978 was initially fol- 
lowed  by  a  reduction  in  imports  (especially  from Japan),  imports  gained 
shares in mid-1979 and 1980. Several factors contributed to the ineffective- 
ness of the TPM, including inadequate enforcement; evasion of violations of 
trigger prices by exporters through various discount and customs adjustments; 
a policy of import controls among members of the EC which gave European 
producers a strong incentive to search for export markets; and a strong U.S. 
dollar. The TPM-initiated antidumping suits filed by the Treasury Department 
concentrated on small suppliers to the United States (Taiwan, Poland, Spain) 
while ignoring significantly more disruptive sources of  imports from the EC 
and Japan (Jones 1986, 136). Domestic producers were increasingly vocal in 
advocating tighter restrictions on imports, evidenced by U.S. Steel’s filing of 
antidumping  complaints  against  seven  EC producers  in early  1980. In  re- 
sponse to this filing, the Carter administration rescinded the TPM. 
A  summer of poor operating results and layoffs and heated election-year 
politics forced President Carter to develop a new plan for steel imports. His 
administration reinstated the TPM in October of 1980, with 12 percent higher 
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trigger prices and updated monitoring and auditing procedures. In return U.S. 
Steel withdrew  its dumping and  subsidy complaints against the European 
steelmakers. 
3.2.3  1982: Voluntary Restraint Agreements with the European 
Community 
Despite a profitable  1981 for most of  the large U.S.  steel companies, the 
firms were dissatisfied with the fortified TPM shortly after its reinstatement. 
High levels of import penetration and sluggish demand weakened the compet- 
itive position of U.S. steelmakers in 1981 and early 1982. Furthermore, EC 
producers, facing their own domestic pressures, disregarded the trigger prices 
and increased deliveries into the U.S. market in late 1981. Imports in  1981 
were six to eight million tons higher than forecasted at the beginning of the 
year  and  caused  a  sharp decrease  in  domestic shipments (Industry Week 
1981  a, 1  10). The unprecedented 25 percent import penetration reached during 
the summer of 1981 prompted U.S. Steel’s CEO David Roderick to comment, 
“Anyone who would say-after  the August totals-that  the TPM is working 
. . . well, you have to question his sanity” (Industry Week 1981b, 32). 
Under pressure from U.S. steel companies, the Commerce Department ini- 
tiated unfair trade investigations against five countries (Belgium, France, Ro- 
mania, Brazil, and South Africa) in November 1981. In  early  1982, seven 
U.S. steel firms filed over a hundred antidumping and subsidy suits against 
several countries,  mostly  directed  against EC  producers  (Hufbauer et  al. 
1986, 170). After the filings, the Commerce Department suspended the TPM 
and its own subsidy investigations (Industry Week 1982a, 22). 
The Europeans, although upset at U.S. actions, were under economic and 
political pressures to reach a negotiated resolution rather than risk the possi- 
bility that the United States would impose antidumping and countervailing 
duties. Talks continued with the United States throughout 1982. Meanwhile, 
the USITC made a preliminary ruling in February 1982 that found injury in 
thirty-nine of ninety-two cases. U.S. firms, concerned that a broader range of 
products was not covered, pressured the Commerce Department to find large 
dumping margins which could be used to bring the EC to negotiate quotas or 
market-sharing arrangements (Jones 1986, 141). 
In  a preliminary determination, the Commerce Department did find high 
margins and required American importers to post cash bonds equivalent to the 
estimated subsidy and dumping margins (Jones 1986, 141). When the Euro- 
peans  threatened retaliation,  negotiations became  tense.  The  EC  and  the 
United States reached an initial agreement in August 1982, but it was rejected 
by  U.S. steel producers. 
On 21 October 1982, the EC and the United States finally reached a settle- 
ment which limited EC exports to 5.5 percent of the U.S. market on ten steel 
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ment took effect on  1 November  1982, and was to run until 31 December 
1985. In exchange for the agreement, forty-five charges of unfair trade prac- 
tices by eight U.S. producers against European producers were dropped. 
3.2.4 
The  1982 VRA with the EC managed to stem the tide of  imports in the 
eleven types of carbon steel products from one source. An  International Trade 
Commission analysis of  the economic effects of  this  agreement, however, 
found only a 1.63 percent decline in imports of total steel mill products (U.S. 
International Trade Commission 1985, 22). Steel imports continued to come 
into the U.S. market in relatively high quantities from other countries. 
U.S. producers continued to pursue actions against non-EC exporters of 
carbon steel products. These actions included suits filed against steel pipe and 
tube producers from South Korea and Taiwan in April 1983; antidumping pe- 
titions filed against Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina in November 1983; and an 
escape clause petition filed by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the United 
Steelworkers of America (USWA) in January 1984. By  May, there were 121 
cases at the USITC regarding steel products. 
Along with the unfair trade and escape clause petitions, a Fair Trade in Steel 
Act of  1984 (S. 2380, H.R. 5081), pushed by U.S. Steel Corporation and the 
American Iron and Steel Institute, was introduced in Congress in April 1984. 
This bill, which died in committee, would have limited imports of  all steel 
products (including specialty steel) to 15 percent of  U.S. consumption for a 
five-year period (Hufbauer et al. 1986, 171). 
The  USITC  found  injury  on  five  major  products  (out  of  nine)  in  the 
Bethlehem-USWA 201 petition. With strong protectionist sentiment in Con- 
gress and uneasy American trading partners, President Reagan announced a 
new set of VRAs aimed at limiting the U.S. market to 20.5 percent of imports. 
These VRAs were to be negotiated with steel exporters having over 0.3 per- 
cent of  the U.S. market (in 1983), including Japan, EC, South Korea, Brazil, 
Mexico,  Spain,  South Africa,  Australia, Argentina, Finland, and Canada. 
The five-year plan covered all steel products, continuous use of unfair trade 
laws (per sec. 301) by the Department of Commerce, possible termination of 
existing unfair trade cases, and negotiations with trading partners over unfair 
trading practices (Jones 1986, 148-49).  By  November 1985, the USTR had 
negotiated fifteen VRAs covering 80 percent of the U.S. imports (Hufbauer et 
al. 1986, 173). 
1984: Voluntary Restraint Agreement Expanded 
3.3  Political Investments: A Theory of Costs and Benefits 
Olson (1971) offers a model to explain the participation of  individual eco- 
nomic actors in the provision of a public good. The decision to allocate cor- 
porate resources to political activity is treated like any other investment deci- 
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the decision is carefully weighed against the expected benefits to the firm. 
This rational model of political investment has been used primarily to explain 
the variation in political activity on the part of firms with an economic interest 
in the provision of a public good. 
In  Olson’s model,  size is the key  variable that distinguishes participants 
from nonparticipants and reflects the intensity of a firm’s commitment to pol- 
itics. A critical assumption underlying this model is that there is a positive 
relationship between the size of the firm and the amount that the firm benefits 
from the public good. Relatively large firms, which have the most to gain 
from the provision of a public good, engage in political activity because their 
expected benefits exceed their political investment. This activity results in 
free goods for smaller firms. As a result of receiving a large benefit from the 
public good for free, Olson (1971) argues smaller firms have little or no incen- 
tive to contribute to the provision of a public good. 
Yoffie (1987,45), like Olson, believes that economic self-interest is the key 
motivation for firms to participate in politics. He questions, however, whether 
firm size explains the degree of  a firm’s involvement in the provision of  a 
public good. In an effort to explain collective action in  terms of  behavioral 
models of corporate decision making, Yoffie raises two objections to Olson’s 
model. 
The first involves resource constraints. In contrast to Olson, Yoffie does not 
assume that every firm that stands to benefit from a public good will have 
enough resources to invest in political activity. Only the more profitable firms 
can afford to engage in politics. 
Second, Yoffie  argues that a firm’s strategic choices affect the level of  its 
political involvement. Specifically, he suggests that Olson’s model does not 
take the impact of diversification into account. A firm that derives significant 
revenues from several divisions may perceive that it gains less from trade pro- 
tection than a firm that depends heavily on sales of  the threatened products. 
Thus a highly diversified firm is likely to be less active in politics even though 
the public good would benefit one of its strategic business units. 
Yoffie further suggests that a firm’s competitive strategy-low  cost or dif- 
ferentiation-may  affect the nature and extent of the benefits that it expects to 
receive from the public good. This in turn may have an impact on the intensity 
of its political involvement. 
3.4  The Model 
We  model first the level of political investment as a function of  variables 
that explain why managers seek trade protection. We then use the same set of 
independent variables in a regression analysis in which the dependent variable 
is the increase (or decrease) in the market value of the firm that results from 
the announcement of  trade protection. To determine whether there is a rela- 
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the value of the firm that results from the announcement  of trade restraints, 
we compare the signs and the significance levels of the coefficients. We cannot 
use the change in the market value of  the firm to explain the level of  firm 
involvement in politics because  the actual returns of the investment are un- 
known and, as such, do not influence the decision to invest a priori. 
This model is based on the assumption that managers expect the discounted 
present value of an investment to be positive, whether resources are allocated 
to political activity, such as the preparation of antidumping and countervail- 
ing-duty  petitions,  or to a new production  technology.  Yet  there is a critical 
difference between these two investment decisions because the returns of  the 
investment in the new production technology can usually be captured entirely 
by the firm making the investment,  whereas the returns of  a successful anti- 
dumping or countervailing-duty petition accrue to some or all of the firms in 
the industry.  We  further assume that  the benefits  to an  individual  firm are 
capitalized  when  a specific trade policy  is announced, not  when a specific 
political action is taken. 
Our sample includes all firms in the U.S. steel industry between  1976 and 
1984 as compiled by  the American Iron  and Steel Institute  and published 
yearly  in Iron Age as well as steel firms listed in the Value Line Investment 
Survey. All the firms in the sample have daily return data available from the 
University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Our 
sample size decreases from twenty-two firms in  1977 to eighteen  firms in 
1984 because of mergers and bankruptcies. 
3.5  The Dependent Variables 
3.5.1  Dependent Variable I: An Estimate of  Firm Political Involvement 
To estimate the level of resources  that firms devote to the provision of a 
public  good, we develop measures  reflecting  the  level of  a firm’s political 
involvement in influencing specific policy initiatives taken by the U.S. gov- 
ernment to protect the steel industry. Our objective is not to determine a pre- 
cise dollar estimate of  the cost of  a firm’s political  activities (firms do not 
report many of  the expenses involved).  Instead, using publicly available in- 
formation, we have constructed a measure  of political involvement that re- 
flects the differences in the relative magnitude of the political involvement of 
the firms in our sample. 
This measure of political involvement has three components, two of which 
involve firm political  activity  toward  the Congress. Although the Congress 
does not typically play a direct role in the resolution of trade disputes, in the 
case of  steel trade, Congress’s threat to restrict imports unilaterally puts pres- 
sure on the president to adopt restrictive measures.  Implicit in our construc- 
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active in ways we can observe will also be the most active in ways we cannot 
observe.’ 
The first component of  this measure is political  action committee (PAC) 
campaign contributions. We assume that PAC contributions to congressional 
candidates are dispersed to increase the ability of firms to influence congres- 
sional actions. In defining this variable, we adopt the model of the Congress 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987) in which oversight committees, because of their 
agenda-setting power, are the most influential in determining the actions that 
Congress might take on a specific issue. Thus, in measuring the level of polit- 
ical involvement of firms, we include only contributions to members of  the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, the 
two major oversight committees on trade policy. 
The second measure that we use to capture the intensity of a firm’s political 
involvement is the number of appearances by members of  a firm’s top man- 
agement team before congressional committees on issues involving trade pol- 
icy.  We  assume that these appearances are costly to the firm in terms of top 
management time, the resources involved in the preparation of testimony, and 
the reputation of the firm that results from taking a public position on a polit- 
ical issue. To confirm that the testimony of  the firm’s representative was in 
support of trade restrictions, we reviewed the text of each testimony. The only 
CEO to testify in opposition to trade restraints during the period analyzed was 
Kenneth Iverson of the Nucor Steel Company, who testified at the 1984 hear- 
ing of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade: 
We fall in an unusual category, we are a profitable steel company and we 
are opposed to trade restrictions on steel products. We believe that tariff or 
nontariff trade barriers will delay modernization of our steel industry, will 
cost the consumer billions of  dollars, and could seriously injure both our 
economy  and smaller steel producers.  (U.S. Congress, House Ways  and 
Means Committee Subcommittee on Trade 1984,286). 
The third measure of  the level of  a firm’s political involvement in efforts 
to obtain trade  protection  is the number of  escape-clause, antidumping, or 
countervailing-duty petitions  filed by  the firm individually or together with 
other firms. We include this measure because steel companies devoted consid- 
erable resources to obtaining trade protection through affirmative findings by 
the Treasury Department, the International Trade Administration of the Com- 
merce Department,  and the International  Trade Commission. Although the 
majority of import restraints on steel were not the direct result of  these peti- 
1. We realize that unobservable political activity may also play an important role in determining 
public policy and may not be consistent with what can be observed. In this analysis,  however, 
since the intent of firms to gain financially through import protection is considered legitimate by 
the majority of the public, there seems to be no reason to expect that firms would support import 
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tions, the sheer number of  the petitions filed put pressure on the executive 
branch to devise a more efficient mechanism to limit steel imports. 
To determine the level of a firm’s political investment in each of these sepa- 
rate trade actions, we include the activities undertaken by  the firms prior to 
the announcement of a trade restraint program. Thus, for the 1977 TPM, we 
include the political activities of firms from 1976 to October 1977. The polit- 
ical investments that led to the 1980 reimposition of the TPM include those 
made in  1978, 1979, and  1980. We  consider that the political investments 
made by  firms in  1981 and 1982 resulted in the 1982 VRA, while the payoff 
for those made in  1983 and  1984 was the announcement of the program to 
negotiate more VRAs in 1984. 
Political involvement encompasses several activities: PAC  contributions, 
congressional testimony, and administrative petitions, each capturing one as- 
pect of political involvement. Simply choosing one as the dependent variable 
and analyzing it separately would lead to biased estimators due to measure- 
ment error. 
One way  to relate these three observed activities to the understanding of 
political involvement is through factor analysis. In this case, we would expect 
that the three observed variables would be defined by single latent factor, po- 
litical involvement. In this analysis, the three political activities were factor 
analyzed, and the results for the factor analysis were used to estimate a factor 
score for each firm’s political activity. The factor scores were then used in a 
regression analysis to establish the relationship between the independent var- 
iables and political involvement. Estimating factor scores can help to reduce 
measurement error (Bollen 1989). Therefore, use of factor scores is useful in 
improving the consistency of estimates. 
Factor analysis was  conducted for each of the time periods,  1977, 1980, 
1982, and 1984. The results are in appendix B. These results were then used 
to calculate the factors scores. The factor scores were created using the “re- 
gression” option in  SPSS’s factor analysis program. The factor loadings are 
generally quite high (above .70), indicating that the observed variables are 
highly related to the latent variable, political involvement. The communalities 
indicate how  much of  the variance in the observed variables is explained by 
the latent factor. The variances are all generally quite high. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the factor scores varies between  .63 and  .87, indicating that the 
observed variables are reliable measures of political involvement. 
3.5.2  Dependent Variable 11: An Estimate of the Change 
in Firm Market Value 
The dependent variable used in the second regression equation is based on 
the impact of the announcement of trade protection on the stock price of indi- 
vidual steel firms. As Schwert (1981,  121-22)  suggests, given the efficient- 
markets/rational expectations hypothesis which “posits that security prices re- 
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the announcement of an unanticipated government policy is “an unbiased es- 
timate of  the value of  the change in future cash flows to the firm.” These 
“event returns” can vary among firms because of differences in the product 
mix and the competitiveness of each firm. 
We use the estimates of these event returns to calculate the investors’ expec- 
tations of the change in the value of individual steel firms in response to gov- 
ernment  announcements  of  trade  restrictions.  Schwert  (1981)  argues that 
stock price data could be used to measure the effects of economic regulation. 
While several studies have investigated the impact of regulatory  announce- 
ments on stock prices,2 two previous studies have used event study methodol- 
ogy to estimate the value to shareholders of  an increase in trade protection. 
Using  a  seemingly  unrelated  regression  analysis,  Lenway,  Rehbein,  and 
Starks (1990) find that the steel industry as a whole gains significantly from 
trade protection  in  1977 and  1982. In a cross-sectional analysis, the results 
indicated that the primary beneficiaries for these two events were the smaller 
integrated steel firms. Hartigan, Perry, and Kamma (1986) analyzed the re- 
turns to firms in industries for which escape clause petitions were filed from 
1975 to  1980. Using weekly returns for a period extending from two weeks 
before the petition was filed through four weeks after the ITC decision, they 
found that the cumulative average return was significantly positive for only 
two of the nineteen industries. One of the industries received trade protection, 
and the other did not. 
Grossman and Levinsohn  (1989,  1065), in  a different application of this 
methodology, measured the responsiveness of the returns to capital investment 
in several U.S.  industries to changes in the import prices. They found in five 
of  six industries that an unanticipated change in the import price of a good 
resulted in substantial gains or losses for shareholders in the industry. 
We  use the following equation to estimate the change in the market value 
for each firm in the sample in response to the government’s announcement of 





rtr  = a, + a~j  + birrnr  + btrrnr4  +  C  wrjrejr  + *rr 
r= -  I0 
= the return on the stock price of firm  i at time t (t =  -250  to 
+  250, where t  = 0 is the announcement date); 
= a  dummy variable,  equal to one for every  day  after the  an- 
nouncement period until the last observation in the sample and 
zero otherwise; 
4 
b,  = the covariance (rtrrn)  divided by the variance (rrn); 
2. See Shipper and Thompson (1983), Binder (1985), Rose (1985), Smith, Bradley, and Farrell 




= the return on a market proxy portfolio,  in this case the return 
on the CRSP value-weighted index, at time t; 
= a dummy  variable  for each date during a given event period, 
equal to 1 if event j occurs during t and equal to 0 otherwise; 




= a random error term with expected value of zero, 
E(u,J  = 
E(U*,,)  = 6; 
E(u,,u,)  = 0 (for a specific firm, no serial correlation). 
Here time t runs from -250  to  +250 (t = 0 is the announcement date of 
the trade restraints). See appendix A for the exact announcement date used for 
each event. The window  that we use to estimate the event period returns is 
t = -  10 to t  = + 1. We chose this window because information about the 
trade programs may have been leaked prior to the official announcement.  In 
searching the Wall Street Journal around the event dates, we found that the 
discussion of  the specific measures taken in a new trade program was within 
ten days prior to the announcement date. 
The inclusion of the CAPM beta allows us to isolate the change in the stock 
price of  a steel firm that is associated with the changes in the overall market 
from those that result from the announcement of trade protection. The dummy 
variables, the dJ,  allow the intercept and slope terms to shift when the market’s 
expectation of  the effects of trade protection changes.  Seemingly unrelated 
regression  analysis is used  to allow for across-equation  correlation of error 
terms to generate more efficient estimates, since our event time equals calen- 
dar time for all firms in the industry. 
The coefficients on the e,, (the w,~,)  lend themselves to a natural interpreta- 
tion. They are equivalent to the event return to firm i for each date. Thus, they 
allow us to interpret the sign, magnitude, and significance of the return to a 
specific firm in response to the announcement of a new restrictive trade policy. 
The sign reflects the market’s evaluation of  whether the firm will gain or lose 
from increased trade protection. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates the 
percentage change in the firm’s stock price that results from the introduction 
of  the new trade policy. These coefficients are not consistently significant be- 
cause our tests may not be  strong enough to detect the impact of the trade 
policy upon the firm’s stock price. In some cases the trade policy announce- 
ment may not significantly affect the stock price of the firm. 
Table 3.2 reports the average event period returns, the t-statistics, and the 
change in the firm’s market value for each of  the individual steel firms in- 
cluded in our analysis by announcement date. In appendix C, we report the 
coefficients for each of the variables in equation (1). To  calculate the change 87  Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection 
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1977  1980 
Change in  Change in 
Market Value  Market Value 









































77,113,416  0.005  1.539 
2,387,412  0.004  0.890 
10,464,036  0.001  0.206 
1,951,800  0.001  0.186 
-47,437,215  -0.002  -0.489 
-2,679,395  -0.004  -0.797 
-47,062,822  -0.004  -0.751 
43,055,472  0.010  1.783* 
-  1,53  1,752 
7,107,180 
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-  18,392,495 
-6,009,132 
-  15,758,859 
-8,812,368 
-  12,364,459 
-  14,756,202 
-  264,045 
4,260,054 
-  340,229 
-1,991,010 















-  0.004 
-  0.001 
0.001 
0.000 
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-  I .058 
N.A. 
0.874 








-  200,064 
-  28,261,800 
47,558,700 
7,528,680 
0.004  0.634 
O.OO0  0.030 
0.008  1.552 
0.014  2.676** 
0.001  .216 
0.009  1.662* 
0.023  3.002** 
0.013  2.503* 
0.000  -0.023 
0.017  -  1.691* 
0.007  1.005 
0.011  1.596 
-  33,020,676 
4,084,536 
~  73,378,212 
1  ,I  7 1,644 
-23,448,264 
4,215,984 


















-  0.307 
1.292 
-  1.441 
0.063 






-  0.532 
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Table 3.2  (continued) 
1982  1984 
Change in  Change in 
Market Value  Market Value 
Firm  6)  W,,,  t-statistic  ($1  WZI,  t-statistic 
~  ~~ 
NATIONAL  147,816,288  0 009  1 425  -45,628,740  -0 006  -  I  078 
NORTHWESTERN  19,042,572  0 008  1 828*  -3,756,432  -0 003  -0  400 
NUCOR  -5,365,320  -0  006  -  1 069  -22,062,384  -0 004  -0  709 
TIMKEN  224,652  0012  2717**  -29,112  -0002  -0516 
U S  STEEL  313,756,056  0 010  1 703*  -46,925,760  -0  001  -0  387 
WHEELING-  49,671,876  0 015  1 645  313,008  OOO  0 028 
PITTSBURGH 
*Significant at the .I level. 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
in firm market value, the event return is multiplied by the value of the firm’s 
common stock at t  = 0. This is an estimate of the dollar gain (or loss) to an 
individual firm that results from the increase in trade protection. 
3.6  The Independent Variables 
3.6.1  Factors Underlying Cross-sectional Differences Among Steel Firms 
Our choice of independent  variables reflects two distinct explanations for 
the positive relationship between the level of a firm’s political investment and 
event return from the announcement of trade protection.  In the first explana- 
tion, based on Olson’s (1971) model of collective action, high expectations of 
gain evoke a high level of political involvement. The second based on Yoffie’s 
extension (1987) of Olson includes factors that reflect resource constraints and 
strategic choices made by  firm^.^ 
We use the firm’s market share to measure the benefits that the firm expects 
to receive from the imposition of increased trade restraints. Olson argues that 
a firms’ return from the provision of a public good is positively related to its 
market share because its expected benefits exceed the amount of  its political 
investment.  Thus, we expect that firms with high market share will be more 
politically involved and also benefit more from trade restraints than will firms 
with low market share. 
To  test Yoffie’s rational model of corporate political behavior, we measure 
whether a firm has adequate resources by  taking its average return on equity 
in the years leading up to the introduction of a new trade program. We mea- 
sure the strategic salience of increased  trade restrictions on steel imports to 
3. We had originally planned to include a measure of firm-level labor costs but dropped it when 
we found it to be highly correlated with the other independent variables, especially market share. 89  Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection 
the individual firms by  the percentage of  steel sales to their total sales. Be- 
cause of the assumption in this model that firm political behavior is based on 
economic self-interest, we expect a high average return on equity and a high 
dependence of a firm on its steel sales will lead to high political involvement 
and high returns from trade protection. 
To obtain an adequate sample size, we have included firms that are “mini- 
mills” as well as integrated steel producers. These firms tend to have very 
different competitive strategies than  integrated steel firms. Minimills have 
been more competitive with imports because of  their cost structure. Bamett 
and Crandall (1986, 27) find that “minimills pay less than integrated firms for 
labor, metallic inputs, and energy, but they are also more efficient in the use 
of these inputs.” Because minimills are more competitive, we expect them to 
be less involved in the politics of trade protection. With respect to event re- 
turns, we  have no prediction on the sign for this variable because although 
trade restraints allow minimills to charge higher prices, they also may have 
resulted  in the delaying the retirement of  USX  and Bethlehem’s relatively 
inefficient plants which produce products similar to those produced by  the 
minimills (Barnett and Crandall 1986, 11  1). To allow for the possibility that 
minimills may have distinct political strategies or benefit differently from the 
imposition  of  trade  restraints,  we  include  a  dummy  variable  to  indicate 
whether a firm is a minimill. 
We use OLS regression to test the following hypotheses: 
(2) 
and 
(3)  CHAV=  a  + 6,SHARE +  ROE  + 6,STSALES  + 6,MINMILL  + u, 
where PINV  is level of  political investment, CHAV is change in firm market 
value, SHARE is market share, ROE is average return on equity, STSALES is steel 
sales as percentage of  total sales,  MINMILL  is whether a firm is a minimill 
(1 =  minimill), and u is an error term. The hypotheses relating these factors to 
both political investment and the change in firm market value are summarized 
below. 
PINV=  a  + 6,SHARE  f  ROE  + 6,STSALES  + 6,MINMILL  + u 
Political Investment  Change in Firm Market Value 
1. SHARE  Positive  Positive 
2. ROE  Positive  Positive 
3. STSALES  Positive  Positive 
4. MINMILL  Negative  ? 
By comparing the results of the two regression equations, we test the hypoth- 
esis that the level of firm political involvement accounts for the change in the 
firm’s market value resulting from the announcement of trade protection. 90  Stefanie Ann Lenway and Douglas A. Schuler 
3.7  Results 
The cross-sectional results for political investment are reported in table 3.3. 
For each of the events, the F-statistics indicate that the model fits the data very 
well. In all four periods, however, market share is the only significant variable 
that explains corporate political investment in trade protection. These results 
suggest that firms with the highest market share and thus the highest expecta- 
tions of financial benefits from trade restraints expend the most effort in at- 
tempting to influence U.S  . trade policy. 
The average return on equity for the years leading up to the introduction of 
the four restrictive programs has the expected sign for 1977, 1982, and 1984, 
and the coefficient for each event approaches significance at the .  1 level. For 
1980, however,  average  ROE is negative and insignificant  in explaining cor- 
porate political investment. These results offer only tentative support that rel- 
atively profitable firms are likely to involve themselves in politics because of 
their access to resources. 
The sign for the variable reflecting the extent to which firms have diversi- 
fied out of steel is negative but not significant for all four periods. The high 
level of political activity on the part of major integrated firms diversifying out 
of steel might account for the unexpected negative signs for this variable. 
Finally, we find that the sign for the dummy variable indicating whether a 
firm is a minimill is positive in for all four events, although again the coeffi- 
cient is not significant.  Our lack of results could be attributed to multicolli- 
nearity between minimills and market share because minimills tend to be con- 
Table 3.3 
Variable  1977  1980  1982  1984 









No. of  observations 
18.40422 
(5.5  17)*  ** 
4.28242 
(1.631) 
-  ,19686 
.05915 
(.149) 









-  ,62597 
(- ,215) 
-  1.20935 













-  ,36009 
( -  ,703) 
,46764 
(1.472) 
-  ,62376 
( -  1.522) 
13.47536 

















Note: r-statistic in parentheses. 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
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sistently  smaller  than  integrated  steel  firms.  An  analysis  of  the  raw  data 
indicates that none of the minimills were politically active in 1977, 1980, and 
1984. Only Keystone, a relatively old minimill, whose stock price declined 
by more than 80 percent between 1976 and 1985 (Barnett and Crandall 1986, 
15) was involved in two countervailing-duty  and one dumping petition that 
led to the 1982 VRA with the EC. 
To determine whether there is a relationship between the level of political 
involvement and the capital market’s assessment of the change in the market 
value  of the  firm that results from the announcement  of  a restrictive trade 
program, we used the same set of  independent  variables as in the political 
investment equation. Table 3.4 reports these results. 
In contrast to the previous results, market share is only positive and signif- 
icant in 1982. Market share is positive and insignificant in 1977 and negative 
and significant in 1982 and 1984. This variable, which most consistently ex- 
plains why firms are politically involved, does not appear to be as useful in 
explaining the distribution of benefits from trade protection. The negative re- 
lationship between market share and the change in the market value of  the 
firm indicates that for two of the four events, firms expecting to gain the most 
from trade protection may actually have been hurt. 
Average return on equity is positive for each of the four events but only 
significant in 1982 at the .05 level. These results suggest that relatively prof- 
itable steel firms gain more from trade restraints than the less profitable firms. 
The positive sign for three of the four events in the previous analysis of polit- 
ical  involvement  taken together with these results  offers tentative evidence 
Table 3.4 
Variable  1977  1980  1982  1984 














-  .04233 
( -  .1520) 
-  ,25001 






-  ,9041  1.09045  -  ,58159 
.08649  ,39775  ,08476 
(.7450)  (2.5230)*  (.2740) 
,38153  ,08157  ,25846 
(3.1340)**  ( ,6210)  ( ,9660) 
-  ,31789  -  ,02519  -  ,02987 
(-2.3990)*  (-,1890)  (- .9040) 
-  1.880  -  ,8010  -  ,7850 
(-7.4260)***  (6.5660)***  (-2.0830)* 
15.507  18  13.63553  1.61 185 
.oooo  .om1  ,2346 
.79495  ,80753  ,34950 
20  18  17 
Nure; r-statistic in parentheses. 
*Significant at the  .I level. 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
***Significant at the ,001 level. 92  Stefanie Ann Lenway and Douglas A. Schuler 
that for the more profitable firms, there may be a relationship between politi- 
cal involvement and the gains to the firm from the imposition of trade protec- 
tion. 
The sign for steel sales as a percentage of  total sales is positive in  1980, 
1982, and 1984 but only significant in  1980. The coefficient is negative but 
not significant in  1977. These results, together with those from the previous 
equation (in which the sign for this variable was consistently negative), sug- 
gest that the highest returns need not go to the most politically active firms. 
The variable indicating whether a firm is a minimill is consistently negative 
for all four events although only significant in  1980 at the  .05 level. These 
relationships suggest that minimills may not have gained from the restrictions 
on steel imports. 
In general, these results do not provide consistent support for the hypothe- 
sis that the most politically active firms gain the most from trade protection. 
For two of the four variables analyzed, we find that the most politically active 
firms may have been made worse off  from the imposition of trade restraints. 
While we find that the announcement of trade protection may have made the 
minimills worse off, we cannot draw any inferences about the relationship 
between the political activity of these firms and gains (or losses) from trade 
protection. 
3.8  Discussion and Conclusion 
Our finding that market share helps to explain the level of a firm’s political 
involvement supports Olson’s (197 1) hypothesis that the firms expecting to 
gain the most are the most politically active. Yet  we do not find that market 
share helps to explain the distribution of the benefits once a new program to 
restrict steel imports is announced. 
We  find mixed support for the alternative hypothesis suggested by  Yoffie 
(1987). Except in  1980, the relationship between a firm’s average ROE and 
level of  political involvement was positive, although the coefficients are not 
significant. The relationship between ROE and the wealth increase to the steel 
firms is also consistently positive. At best, this offers extremely tentative sup- 
port for the hypotheses derived from Yoffie’s model that the more profitable 
firms will engage in politics and that firm profitability helps explain which 
firms will benefit from trade protection. 
The negative, but statistically insignificant, relationship between firm di- 
versification and political involvement does not support Yoffie’s proposition 
that political activity is related to the perceived impact of  a specific policy on 
a firm. It is possible that even though certain firms have diversified, top man- 
agement remains more committed to steel than to their other businesses. Yet 
the positive and significant relationship between steel sales as a percentage of 
total sales and the change in  the market value of  the firm in  1980 and the 
positive but insignificant relationship in 1982 and 1984 indicate that diversi- 93  Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection 
fied firms, although the most politically active, did not gain from trade protec- 
tion. The consistently negative sign for minimills in the analysis of the change 
in firm value suggests that the stock market did not react as if trade restraints 
were expected to help these firms. 
These results suggest that there is no consistent relationship between the 
level of  a firm’s political involvement in attempts to obtain trade protection 
and the benefits that they receive as reflected in the market’s reevaluation of 
their future earning p~tential.~  In other words, the primary beneficiaries from 
trade protection do not appear to be the firms that devote the most resources 
to congressional lobbying and the preparation of petitions filed at the Interna- 
tional Trade Commission and the Commerce Department. This finding chal- 
lenges one of the basic assumptions of rational models of corporate political 
behavior, namely, that there is a positive relationship between expected and 
actual returns to the provision of a public good. In fact, this relationship may 
be much more complex than originally a~sumed.~ 
One possible alternative explanation is that  managers face an  extremely 
high degree of  uncertainty in assessing the degree to which their firm will 
benefit from trade protection relative to others in the industry. Unlike the es- 
tate owner in Olson’s world, who has considerable certainty that if taxes are 
reduced, she will benefit more than will the owners of a modest cottage, the 
management of a politically active steel firm may not know how the reduction 
of imports will benefit their firm relative to their domestic competitors. Jour- 
nalistic accounts indicate that steel firms typically respond to the imposition 
of  trade restraints by raising prices, but this does not reveal much about the 
competitive dynamics among U. S. steel producers, which ultimately affects 
the distribution of  benefits from trade protection. Another possible explana- 
tion is that the firms with the largest market share are absorbing some of  the 
costs of  political activity as part of their responsibilities as the industry’s po- 
litical leaders, even though they do not expect to benefit in the short run. 
4. We also ran a simple regression analyzing the change in the market value of the firm in terms 
of a firm’s political involvement. Given the high correlation between market share and political 
involvement, it was not possible to include market share as an independent variable in this analy- 
sis. We found that political involvement explained the increase in the value of the firm at almost 
the .05 level of  significance in 1977 and at the .01 level in 1982. In  1980 and 1984 the results 
were negative and significant at the .05 level. One inference that could be drawn from these results 
is that there is no consistent relationship between the gains (or losses) that a firm experiences as a 
result of increased import protection and its level of political investment. The negative relationship 
in 1980 and 1984 could also indicate that the stock market had anticipated more stringent restraints 
than were implemented by the government. 
5. Because we are performing these tests on individual securities, the changes that result from 
the announcement of the imposition of trade restraints are very small. In addition, because many 
uncertain factors affect stock returns, it is possible that the impact of the announcement of  trade 
protection will be insignificant. Since we may not capture fully the complete wealth effect of the 
change in the level of  trade protection,  we also ran eq. (2) using as the dependent variable the 
firm’s standardized abnormal return to weigh more heavily the event returns of  the firms whose 
returns are significant as well as to correct for heteroscedasticity (Scbwert 1981, 138).  The results, 
both in term of signs and significance levels, lend themselves to the same interpretation as above. 94  Stefanie Ann Lenway and Douglas A. Schuler 
Further research is needed to determine what factors explain the distribu- 
tion of benefits resulting from trade protection to individual steel firms. This 
would involve using measures that reflect both the product mix of the compa- 
nies and the product coverage of the steel trade programs as well as macroeco- 
nomic variables to control for the level of aggregate economic demand. Com- 
paring the factors that affect the distribution of benefits from trade protection 
with those that affect the level of a firm’s political involvement may lead to a 
better understanding of why managers do not appear to act in their sharehold- 
ers’ interests in their pursuit of trade protection. 
Our investigation may  have an impact on trade policy  if  it is possible to 
develop a systematic explanation  of why  the most important proponents of 
trade protection are not the biggest beneficiaries.  Legislators and policymak- 
ers have determined that trade restraints help the industry and assume that they 
will help those firms that claim import competition is unfair. This study pro- 
vides tentative evidence that these policies may not be helping the firms mak- 
ing the claims and may put the most efficient of  U.S. steel firms, the mini- 
mills, at a competitive disadvantage. 
Appendix A 
Summary of the Event Dates 
5 December 1977 
1 October 1980 
21 October 1982 
The trigger  price  mechanism  was imposed by  the 
Carter administration. 
The trigger price mechanism was strengthened and 
reinstated. 
The United States announced a program to negotiate 
a  series  of  voluntary  restraint  agreements  with 
members of the European Community. 
The United States announced a program to negotiate 
voluntary restraint agreements with countries not 
covered by  the previous  arrangement,  including 
Korea, Spain, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and 
Australia. Japanese imports were also limited to 
5.8 percent of the U.S. market. 
14 September 1984 95  Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection 
Appendix B 
Factor Analysis of Political Involvement Variables 
PAC = Firm political action committee contributions 
CONG  = Congressional testimony by corporate executives 
TOTADM  = Number of escape-clause, countervailing-duty, and antidumping 




PAC  .87853 
TOTADM  .70752 
CONG  .88749 
Final statistics: 
Variable  Communality  Factor  Eigenvalue  % of  Var  Cum % 
PAC  .77181  1  2.06004  68.7  68.7 
TOTADM  .50059 
CONG  ,78765 




PAC  .64855 
CONG  .83672 
TOTADM  .76422 
Final statistics: 
Variable  Communaliry  Factor  Eigenvalue  % of  Var  Cum % 
PAC  .42062  1  1.70474  56.8  56.8 
CONG  .70010 
TOTADM  33403 




PAC  .87843 
CONG  .79926 
TOTADM  .85110 
Final statistics: 
Variable  Communality  Factor  Eigenvalue  % of  Var  Cum % 
PAC  .77164  1  2.13483  71.2  71.2 
CONG  .63881 
TOTADM  .72437 




PAC  .93974 
CONG  .83559 
TOTADM  .93620 
Final statistics: 
Variable  Communality  Factor  Eigenvulue  % of  Var  Cum % 
PAC  .88311  1  2.45779  81.9  81.9 
CONG  .69820 
TOTADM  .87648 
Cronbach’s alpha for factor scores = .87 Appendix C 
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All Variables  for the Period Ending 1984 
-  0.002  13  0.00069  1.35427  0.17361 
( -  1.529)  (.356)  (7.148)***  (.576) 
-0.00026  -  0.0002  12  0.346  17  0.28539 
(- .228)  ( -  ,134)  (2.264)*  (1.173) 
-0.00088  O.ooOo4  1.7705  -  0.26936 
( -  ,807)  (.028)  (11.973)***  (-1,145) 
-0.00011  -0.00045  0.56889  0.06  193 
(-.124)  (- ,362)  (4.694)***  (.321) 
0.00015  -0.00245  0.69291  -0.11  139 
(.loo)  ( -  1.190)  (3.466)**  (- ,350) 
0.00047  0.00034  0.51834  -0.25264 
-  0.00639 
0.01  192 
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*Significant at the .I0 level. 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
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Comment  Timothy J. McKeown 
Stimulated in large measure by  federal campaign finance legislation in the 
mid-1970s and the wealth of newly available data generated as a result of that 
legislation’s reporting requirements, a number of political scientists, sociolo- 
gists, and economists recently have developed models of  corporate political 
effort. The paper by Lenway and Schuler is broadly similar to existing work 
but offers a number of potentially fruitful innovations. First, this is one of  the 
first attempts to relate above-normal returns to prior political activity. Second, 
it acknowledges that corporate political activity is a multidimensional phe- 
nomenon, and it displays some awareness of the possibility that the determi- 
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nants of visible activity may not be the same as the determinants of  unobserv- 
able activity. Third, it offers a detailed examination of individual firms within 
a sector rather than of a sample drawn from all manufacturing (the more com- 
mon procedure).  Because the work is exploratory both theoretically and em- 
pirically, I will focus on three broad areas: the proposed model and alternative 
specifications,  the interpretation  of findings,  and possibilities  for additional 
research. 
The Proposed Model 
The Yoffie model by way of Lenway and Schuler argues that political activ- 
ity is an increasing function of  rate of return.  Zardkoohi has also suggested 
such a relationship, based not on the necessity of relying on internal resources 
but instead simply on a conventional assumption about the income elasticity 
of political activity.’ There are, however, other arguments. Salamon and Sieg- 
fried argue that firms which visibly pursue political objectives while earning 
high profits  invite unfriendly  attention and counter-mobilization.2 A behav- 
ioral theory of the firm?  suggests that when financial performance falls below 
aspirations, then search and innovation and presumably political effort will be 
intensified. A variant of this theory argues that performance that significantly 
exceeds aspirations  will also lead to more search and innovation, as various 
organizational subunits seize slack resources and use them for their own pet 
 project^.^ These hypotheses imply an nonlinear relationship between financial 
performance and political activity; thus the specification offered in this paper 
hardly exhausts the theoretical possibilities. 
The unusual  feature of  the paper is the way in which return on equity is 
conceptualized. Rather than being treated as a factor affecting the motivation 
to act politically, it is used to indicate the capability to act. Of course, the rate 
of  return indicates this only when one already knows the size of  the capital 
stock on which the returns are being reaped. It would seem more direct to use 
corporate income in dollars to model this capability. If one were interested in 
modeling the level of corporate PAC expenditures, it would be appropriate to 
use the number of white-collar employees and their average salary, since these 
are the people who decide to contribute, at least in a juridical sense. 
The authors argue that diversification tends to undercut the motivation  to 
engage in political action in any sector. This is based on the notion that top 
1. Asghar Zardkoohi,  “On the Political Participation of  the Firm in the Electoral Process,” 
Economic Journal 51( 1985): 804-17. 
2. Lester M. Salamon and John J. Siegfried, “Economic Power and Political Influence: The 
Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy,” American Pulirical Science Review 71 (3) (1977): 
1026-43. 
3. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory uf rheFirm (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall,  1963). 
4. James G. March, “Footnotes to Organizational Change,” Adminisrrarive Science Quarterly 
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managers are only boundedly rational, that their attention is limited, and that 
only the most salient political opportunities and threats are perceived by these 
managers. However, political  action can to some extent be decentralized  in 
multidivisional firms, as, for example, when a steel firm like USX establishes 
different political action committees for different divisions of  the firm. In ad- 
dition, management of the firm’s political environment  may be a heavy re- 
sponsibility for top management, so that they shed other responsibilities be- 
fore they  give up  supervision  of  the  firm’s political  strategy.  One simple 
reason  why  multidivisional  firms may  be less politically  active on a given 
issue than single-product counterparts is that different divisions may have con- 
flicting interests in protection of steel. This would follow if the multidivision 
enterprise is both a producer and a consumer of steel. 
Interpreting the Empirical Results 
The findings on political  involvement  show that  market  share is consist- 
ently positively  related to level of  activity. This is not inconsistent with 01- 
son’s standard  argument, but  a  curvilinear  rather  than  a linear relationship 
would seem to be implied by a free-riding argument. The main puzzle that the 
authors set for themselves is the disparity between the results on political in- 
volvement and those on abnormal returns. Why are the results dissimilar? One 
reason is the very explanation that the authors reject. If small firms derive the 
same advantages from protection as large firms, but free ride, or at least make 
proportionately  no greater political efforts than the large firms, then market 
share would have no relationship to abnormal returns,  but it would be posi- 
tively  related  to level of political effort. That is exactly  what their findings 
show. 
The minimills,  other things being equal, are as (in)active as the integrated 
producers.  This is so in the face of results on the abnormal returns equations 
that suggest a weak tendency for minimills to lose wealth from the trade re- 
straints secured by the integrated producers.  One way to make sense of these 
results is to consider the possibility of strategic interaction between the inte- 
grated producers  and the minimills.  The minimills may have refrained from 
political action not because they were free riding on the integrated producers 
but  rather  because of  a rational  calculation  that  enhanced  political  activity 
could easily be matched by greater efforts by the integrated producers,  thus 
producing  no change in political  outcomes but  a greater expenditure of re- 
sources for all concerned. 
Extensions of the Research 
Lenway and Schuler suggest that considering  the specific product mix of 
firms compared to the products covered by protective measures would likely 
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suggest that they consider the geographic region where the firm’s sales take 
place and relate that to the countries that are the target of the protective mea- 
sures. For example, West Coast producers will benefit more from protection 
imposed on  East Asian  producers, East Coast producers  will be relatively 
more concerned about protection levied against European producers. 
A number of  alternative strategies for modeling political activity are im- 
plicit in my previous comments. In addition, the following measures could be 
taken: 
1. Model the individual elements of  a vector of  political activities rather 
than using factor analysis to create a single summary statistic. This would be 
particularly helpful if one were attempting to evaluate the ways in which dif- 
ferent mixes of political activity are chosen by different firms, or if one were 
interested in the degree of substitutability of different political activities. 
2. Explicitly model the level of political activity by  firms opposed to pro- 
posed policy changes. This is another possible source of a disparity between 
protectionist political effort and protectionist political results. 
3. Model the nature of the political situation in which political activity is 
occurring. The degree of success may be affected by the thinness of the gov- 
erning coalition’s majority, the time left until the next election, and the level 
of demands being placed on the government by  other groups, including for- 
eigners. 
Comment  Wendy E. Takacs 
I found the Lenway and Schuler paper very interesting. The results of  the 
hypothesis testing were enlightening, but in addition I found some of the in- 
termediate results to be equally intriguing, perhaps because they provide evi- 
dence for some hypotheses of my  own about what determines attempts to 
obtain protection and the importance of the form of protection granted. 
My comments begin with some observations on the results and conjectures 
as to why those results were obtained, add some miscellaneous observations, 
and end with some suggestions for extensions. 
The main thrust of the paper is to provide empirical evidence on a number 
of questions pertaining to the involvement of  individual firms in attempts to 
gain protection: 
1. What factors determine a firm’s degree of  political involvement in  at- 
tempts to obtain protection where the political activity is measured by political 
contributions, testimony before Congress, and the number of cases launched 
in the three established procedures for petitioning for protection: antidump- 
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ing-duty investigations, countervailing-duty investigations, and escape-clause 
actions? 
2. Do these same factors determine the benefits of protection, measured by 
abnormally high  stock prices during a period  of  time surrounding the an- 
nouncement of the protection? 
3. Are the more politically involved firms the ones that receive the greatest 
benefits from protection? 
The clearest result is that market share is the most significant determinant 
of  the amount of  resources firms devote to the activity of  attempting to get 
protection. The authors conclude, “firms with higher expectations of financial 
benefits from trade restraints expend the most effort in attempting to influence 
U.S. trade policy.”  It is useful to note that the expectation of financial benefits 
from trade restraints has two components: (1) the expectation of  a positive 
result, that is, the expectation of being able to influence policymaking in the 
desired direction, and (2) the size of the gain if protection is obtained. 
Larger firms probably have a higher expectation of being able to influence 
policy by  their individual actions than do smaller firms and probably have 
more to gain than smaller firms. Larger firms have more employees and there- 
fore more votes; larger firms are more likely to be multiple plant operations 
and therefore be constituents to more politicians. Particularly in an industry 
like steel, they are probably accustomed to being able to influence their prod- 
uct market, so why not the political market for protection as well? They may 
perceive themselves as having a higher probability of influencing the political 
process. On the second point, firms with larger market share have more out- 
put, and so if prices increase due to protection, they stand to receive larger 
rent transfers. 
I also found it noteworthy that firms with a higher return on equity in years 
leading up to the protectionist episode appeared to devote more resources to 
attempts to obtain protection. This relationship did not quite reach a level of 
statistical significance at conventional levels. But it still contradicts the image 
of hard-pressed import competing firms with their backs to the wall seeking 
protection as a last resort out of desperation. The results indicate that firms 
devote resources to further improving their profitability when they are rela- 
tively better off. This result, albeit tentative because of the lack of statistical 
significance, has important implications for the duration of  protection. Ob- 
taining protection will encourage firms to devote yet more resources to the 
campaign to maintain the protection because it increases their expectations of 
being able to influence the political process and increases their profitability, 
giving them more resources to devote to the campaign to maintain the protec- 
tionist measures. 
At first it struck me as perplexing that the factors that explain firms’ degree 
of  political involvement did not appear to explain the benefits they receive 
from the protection, and that there was no apparent direct relationship be- 
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at least as measured by increases in share prices. Let me offer some conjec- 
tures as to why this result was obtained. 
The first has to do with the role of  expectations and the method that the 
authors use to measure the benefits of protection. The authors use two win- 
dows of abnormal returns,  one starting ten days before and ending ten days 
after the announcement of protection,  and the other starting ten days before 
and ending one day after the announcement. Both of these periods may be too 
short, in that  share prices  may  already reflect  the  expected benefits of  the 
government’s expected action well before this. In that case, the windows used 
would  reflect  abnormally  high  returns  only  if  the  protection  received  was 
greater than had been expected, and abnormally low returns only if  the an- 
nounced protection was less restrictive than anticipated. 
To  make  a  comparison  with  some  similar  work,  Hartigan,  Perry,  and 
Kamma used a similar methodology to test for the impact of escape clause 
actions on share prices.’ Their study used weekly data, and a window starting 
two weeks before an escape-clause petition was filed and ending four weeks 
after the final decision, a period that averaged about forty weeks. Lenway and 
Schuler might be able to better measure the expected benefits of protection by 
expanding the window backward, but it is not clear that doing so will dramat- 
ically alter the results, because even with the longer window Hartigan and his 
colleagues found that only two of nineteen  industries had significantly posi- 
tive abnormal returns. Their work does provide some support for the notion 
that protectionist measures more or less restrictive than those anticipated will 
affect stock prices. They analyzed the behavior of stock prices around the key 
dates of  the  USITC  and  presidential  decisions,  and found one case with  a 
significantly negative reaction of stock prices to a presidential decision to pro- 
tect the petitioning industry. In that case, however, the ITC had recommended 
import quotas, but the president decided to negotiate a VER, which may have 
been viewed  as less restrictive than anticipated,  causing stock prices to fall 
when that decision was announced. 
My  second conjecture  as to the lack of perceived  profitability  of  the an- 
nounced protection  is that the costs of the attempts to obtain protection  eat 
into the increased profits from it, leaving little net gain. The behavior of stock 
prices may reflect a correct assessment of the benefits of protection, coupled 
with recognition of the magnitude of the costs involved in lobbying, and the 
lawyers’ and consultants’ fees required to initiate and carry through with an 
antidumping, countervailing-duty,  or escape-clause petition. The results in the 
paper thus could be interpreted as evidence of the wastefulness of  rent-seeking 
behavior,  which  leaves  little net  gain  even  for the  firms  most  actively  in- 
volved. 
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In  addition to commenting  on the results,  I would  like to say something 
about the data reported by the authors. I found the data on abnormal returns 
for the four protective episodes examined particularly intriguing  because of 
the positive and highly significant abnormal returns when the OMA was ne- 
gotiated with the EC in 1982, as compared with the trigger price mechanism 
in 1977, its reinstitution in 1980, and the extension of the OMA in 1984. This 
information provides some empirical support for the notion that in relatively 
concentrated industries,  quantitative restrictions provide greater possibilities 
for increased prices and profits than price-oriented measures.  Given my point 
above about expectations, this would have to be interpreted  as unanticipated 
use of  quotas rather than price-oriented measures. This interpretation  seems 
reasonable in that in  1982 the steel companies filed countervailing  duty and 
antidumping duty petitions, which normally would have been expected to re- 
sult in extra duties, but instead the administration reacted by negotiating the 
OMA. 
With respect to extensions, I agree with the authors that it would be useful 
to include a variable to capture the effect of the particular firm’s product mix. 
Political involvement might be found to depend on the degree of import pen- 
etration in the firm’s major products, and abnormal returns might be found to 
depend on the firms’ product mix relative to the restrictiveness of the protec- 
tive measure for various products. 
A variable to capture the effects of  geography might also help to capture the 
relative benefits of protection across firms. It is my understanding  that firms 
near the coasts, particularly the West and Gulf coasts, were under more com- 
petitive pressure from imports than firms in the center of the country. Perhaps 
this dimension could be captured by a variable based on the distance of  the 
firm’s plants from the nearest deepwater port or some measure of import pen- 
etration by region relative to the location of the firm’s plants. 
Lastly, it is also interesting to contemplate the extension of this methodol- 
ogy  to other industries.  What  if  any  modifications  or additional  variables 
would  be necessary  to capture differences  among firms in those industries? 
Two other industries that have campaigned to obtain protection  are footwear 
and automobiles.  In those industries a very important factor, which does not 
appear in the steel case, is the degree to which the firm is involved in import- 
ing for domestic sale as well as selling domestically produced output. It is not 
surprising that the auto escape-clause petition in 1980 was filed by Ford Motor 
Company and the United Auto Workers, without direct participation by Gen- 
eral Motors or Chrysler,  who were more deeply engaged in the activity  of 
selling imported small cars and trucks, the so-called captive imports. 
When firms in an industry differ in the degree to which they import as well 
as produce at home, attempts to gain protection may be an attempt by domes- 
tic firms to gain an advantage relative not only to foreign firms but also to 
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that at least one domestic steel firm testified against imposing import restric- 
tions and the result that abnormal returns were significantly  lower for mini- 
mills when protection was announced in 1977. The possible use of  protection- 
ist measures as strategic maneuvering vis-a-vis other domestic firms deserves 
more attention and investigation. 